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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The present case is in line with the trend of Louisiana juris-
prudence toward a very liberal rule in regard to the presence of
the accused at a felony trial. The cases indicate that the accused
still has the right to be present at important stages of the trial,
but that he may waive this right.51 Such waiver has been found
where the accused voluntarily absented himself from the trial;5
also a failure to urge promptly his right to file an exception to a
part of the proceeding being held in his absence may operate as a
waiver unless he can show that he had suffered injury by the pro-
ceeding continued in his absence. 5 This is a fair and equitable
manner of disposing of such situations. The accused has not been
denied any substantial right to which he is entitled, and the court
has removed another technical device frequently seized upon by
convicted criminals in an effort to delay punishment.
In an effort to alleviate conflicts in the criminal procedure of
the various states, so that practicing attorneys will know defi-
nitely when the presence of the accused is essential and when it is
generally required but may be waived, the American Law Insti-
tute has devoted a section of their model code of criminal pro-
cedure to the problem.5 4 The adoption of such a provision might
do much to clarify this unsettled area of criminal procedure in
Louisiana. R.O.R.
PEREMPTION - PRESCRIPTION - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -
INTERRUPTION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LIMITATIVE PERIOD BY
FILING SuiT-Plaintiff was injured while employed in Louisiana
something showing that the law has been overlooked or neglected, or treated
with indifference."
51. Supra note 37.
52. Supra note 35.
53. Supra note 36.
54. American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) c. 14, §
287:
"In a prosecution for a felony the defendant shall be present:
"(a) at arraignment
"(b) when a plea of guilty is made
"(c) at the calling, examination, challenging, impanelling, and swearing
of the jury
"(d) at all proceedings before the court when the jury is present
"(e) when evidence is addressed to the court out of the presence of the
jury for the purpose of laying the foundation for the introduction of evidence
before the jury.
"(f) at a view by the jury
"(g) at the rendition of the verdict.
"If the defendant is voluntarily absent, the proceedings mentioned above,
except those in clauses (a) and (b) may be had in his absence if the court so
orders."
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by a resident of Texas. He sued under the Louisiana Workmen's
Compensation Statute. Previously he had brought suit at his em-
ployer's residence in Texas but through comity the court refused
to exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiff then filed suit in Caddo Parish,
the place of the accident, but the suit was dismissed for want of
personal jurisdiction over the employer. The plaintiff next filed
the present action against the insurance company in East Baton
Rouge Parish and was met with a plea of one, year peremption
which was sustained by the district court. The ruling was af-
firmed by the court of appeal, holding that the one year limita-
tion in which suit must be brought under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Statute1 was one of peremption rather than prescrip-
tion and the filing of the two previous suits in no wise affected
the running of peremption. 2 Certiorari was granted by the su-
preme court and the decision of the court of appeal was reversed.
Held, irrespective of whether or not the limitation be one of pre-
scription or peremption, plaintiff had done all that was required
of him under the statute. Harris v. Traders and General Insur-
ance Company, 8 So. (2d) 289 (La. 1942).
Prescription bars recovery on a cause of action.8 The filing of
suit in a court of competent jurisdiction4 or the serving of citation
on the opposing party, whether or not the suit was brought in a
court of competent jurisdiction, 5 interrupts all prescriptions. De-
fendant in the instant case contended unsuccessfully that the fil-
ing of suit did not interrupt peremptive periods, the same as per-
emption not being suspended as to minors.'
The doctrine of peremption as such has developed in the
jurisprudence of Louisiana without direct authority in either the
Civil Code or the Code of Practice. Where a statute creates a
right of action and also stipulates the period in which that right
is to be exercised, then the limitation is not one of prescription
1. Act 20 of 1914, as amended by Acts 85 of 1926 and 29 of 1934 (Dart's
Stats. (1939) §44201.
2. Harris v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 4 So.(2d) 24 (La. App. 1941).
3. Art. 3457, La. Civil Code of 1870. If the limitation is one of peremption
then the cause of action is destroyed. It would seem that the proper pro-
cedure for the defendant to employ Would be to file an exception of no cause
of action rather than a plea of peremption (as was done in the principal
case) or prescription. See McMahon, The Exception of No Cause of Action
in Louisiana (1934) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 29.
4. La. Act 39 of 1932 (Dart's Stats. (1939) §2062.1].
5. Art. 3518, La. Civil Code of 1870. Citation does not necessarily have to
be such as is required for rendition of a valid judgment. Mitchell v. Sklar,
196 So. 392 (La. App. 1940). See Note (1934) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 285.
6. Ashby v. Ashby, 41 La. Ann. 102, 5 So. 539 (1899).
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but one of peremption.7 The basic difference between the two
seems to be that statutes of prescription simply bar recovery,
whereas statutes of peremption completely extinguish the cause
of action. However, no satisfactory test for distinguishing the
types of limitative periods has been given.8 The principle of per-
emption referred to in this case is similar to the doctrine of per-
emption applied to the limitation of time within which a mort-
gage must be reinscribed in order to have any effect as to third
persons." Such a period admits of no interruptions or suspensions.
Another similar problem is presented in conflict of laws where
the question is whether a particular statute of limitation is one
of substance or procedure. Here the distinction is also made be-
tween statutes which bar the bringing of an action and those
which wholly extinguish the cause of action."
In the French law there are two doctrines similar to the the-
ory of peremption as applied in Louisiana. The plea of pgremp-
tion d'instancell granted by the French Code of Civil Procedure 1 2
pertains to the abandonment of a cause of action after the filing
7. Guillory v. Avoyelles Ry., 104 La. 11, 28 So. 899 (1900).
8. The court has used the words peremption and prescription indiscrim-
inately in regard to both actions arising under Article 2315 and the Work-
men's Compensation Act. The limitation is referred to as one of "peremp-
tion" in Matthews v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 10 La. App. 342, 120 So. 907
(1929); Brister v. Wray Dickinson Co., 183 La. 562, 164 So. 415 (1935); Heard
v. Receivers of Parker Gravel Co., 194 So. 142 (La. App. 1938); Harris v.
Traders and General Ins. Co., 4 So.(2d) 24 (La. App. 1941). The limitation is
treated as one of ordinary "prescription" in Norwood v. Lake Bisteneau Oil
Co., 145 La. 823, 83 So. 25 (1919); O'Neal v. Board of Com'rs of Port of New
Orleans, 118 So. 770 (La. App. 1928); Keith v. Texas and Pacific Ry., 171 La.
757, 132 So. 223 (1931); Williams v. City of Shreveport, 142 So. 335 (La. App.
1932); Mitchell v. Sklar, 196 So. 392 (La. App. 1940).
9. Art. 3369, La. Civil Code of 1870. The performance of the required act
must be accomplished within the specified limitation at the peril of the one
whose duty it is to perform such act. Shepherd v. The Orleans Cotton Press
Co., 2 La. Ann. 100 (1847); Young v. City Bank of New Orleans, 9 La. Ann.
193 (1854); Watson v. Bondurant, 30 La. Ann. 1 (1878); Murff v. Ratcliff, 19
La. App. 109, 138 So. 908 (1932); Friedrich v. Handy Andy Community Stores
of La., Inc., 164 So. 486 (La. App. 1935). See Daggett, The Chattel Mortgage
In Louisiana (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 19, 39.
10. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of the Conflict of
Laws (1934) §605; 3 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (1935) §605.1. See
Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev.
474; Comment (1919) 28 Yale L. J. 492.
11. In French law the plea of pdremption d'instance is permitted in di-
vorce matters when one spouse gets a decree of separation but neglects to
get the final decree of divorce. 3 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Chauveau et Ch~naux,
Trait6 Th6orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, 3 des Personnes (1902) 87, no 146.
In matters of reclamation of dtat (estate): Art. 30, French Code of Civil
Procedure, and 3 Baudry-Lancantinerie, op. cit. supra; at 492, no 586. And as
between co-debtors bound in solido a judgment by default against them pre-
vents either from later contesting the action: Art. 1206, French Civil Code;
13 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra, 2 des Obligations, at 333, no 1219.
12. Arts. 397-401, French Code of Civil Procedure.
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of suit.18 However, the nearest thing in the French law to per-
emption as applied in Louisiana is the theory of ddch6ance which
deals with the "forfeiture of a right" after the limitation pre-
scribed in the statute or article has expired. 14 The French com-
mentators differ on the question of whether or not the general
rules of prescription apply also to ddch6ance."5
The term "peremption" invoked in the instant case made its
appearance in an often cited case'16 in which the statement of the
doctrine was not necessary to the final decision. Yet this dictum
has influenced the Louisiana jurisprudence to such an extent that
13. Compare Art. 3519, La. Civil Code of 1870.
14. The principle of d~chdance was applied in the early case of Ashby v.
Ashby, 41 La. Ann. 102, 5 So. 539 (1889) (see the attorneys' briefs in 41 La.
Ann. 102). The court held that the one year limitation prescribed by Art.
1987, La. Civil Code of 1870, for bringing of a revocatory action was not
suspended as to minors as in the case of prescription, Art. 3522, La. Civil
Code of 1870, but was forfeited at the expiration of one year. The court used
the term "forfeiture" rather than ddchdance.
15. Baudry-Lacantinerie seem to be of the opinion that the ordinary rules
of prescription apply also to dlchdance. 25 Baudry-Lacantinerle, op. cit.
supra note 10, de Prescription, at 41, no 40 and 12 Aubry et Rau, Cours de
Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1913) 536, § 771. But see 1 Guillouard, Trait6 de
la Prescription (2 ed. 1902) 47, no 45.
16. "When a statute creates a right of action, and stipulates the delay
In which that right is to be executed, the delay thus fixed is not, properly
speaking, one of prescription, but it is one of peremption. Statutes of peremp-
tion destroy the cause of action itself. That is to say, after the limit of time
expires the cause of action no longer exists; it is lost." Guillory v. Avoyelles
Ry., 104 La. 11, 15, 28 So. 99, 101 (1900). In that case suit was brought to
contest a special tax levied in favor of the defendant by the majority of
property tax payers under authority of a statute which required the bringing
of the action within three months after the election. The ratio decidendi
was that the present plaintiff was not included as one of the plaintiffs In a
prior action brought on the same set of facts and for the same purpose, so
there was nothing as to the present plaintiff to Interrupt prescription. To
substantiate the dictim, so often quoted [See Hollingsworth v. Schanland,
155 La. 825, 833, 99 So. 613, 616 (1924); Brister v. Wray Dickinson Co., Inc.,
183 La. 562, 565, 164 So. 415, 416 (1935).], the Guillory case cites only two com-
mon law courts as authority. In the first, V. Taylor v. Cranberry Iron and
Coal Co., 94 N.C. 525 (1886), an action was brought for wrongful death under
a statute containing a one year limitation. Suit was filed two years after
the accident. Since there had been nothing to interrupt the statute of limi-
tation, recovery was denied. In the second case, Cooper v. Lyons, 9 Lea 596,
77 Tenn. 489 (1867), suit was brought by creditors to oppose a final accounting
of an administrator after a seven year limitation had run. The creditors
had requested the administrator to delay his final accounting. This was held
not to interrupt the running of the statute. But even in these cases it was
unnecessary to say that the cause of action had been destroyed since the
court could have applied the general rules of limitations barring the plain-
tiff's right to sue. There was nothing in either of the cases cited to toll the
running of the limitations. When a statue creates a cause of action where
none existed before and fixes a time within which the action must be
brought, bringing suit within that time is a condition precedent to recovery
and the defendant may not be estopped from setting up the limitation by al-
leged misrepresentations or frauds. Notes (1914) 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 721, (1932) 77
A.L.R. 1044, 1050, (1932) 78 A.L.R. 1294.
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the courts seem now to accept it as a settled principle. The doc-
trine was first applied in an action for wrongful death under the
Civil Code Article 2315 in Matthews v. Kansas City Southern
Railway Company, 7 but it was rejected by the same court re-
cently in an action under the Workmen's Compensation Act.18
The federal district court also refused to apply the doctrine of
peremption to a personal action 5 under Article 2315, permitting
the application of the rules concerning the interruption of pre-
scription. The opinion of the court of appeal cited only the ear-
lier case as authority for the application of the strict theory of
peremption without mentioning the later decision which ex-
pressly overruled the Matthews case as "not correctly reflecting
the law of this state on this subject.
'2 0
The pertinent provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act
does not label the limitation imposed as one of peremption or
prescription. 21 Considered in the light of the purpose to be served
by the Workmen's Compensation Act, the ruling of the principal
case seems highly commendable. 22 Workmen's compensation stat-
17. 10 La. App. 382, 120 So. 907 (La. App. 1929). The beneficiaries under
Article 2315 first sued in the federal court. Their action was dismissed and
before they could bring suit in the state court the one year limitation of
the article had elapsed. The court held that their cause of action had
perempted, i.e., it had been extinguished. See criticism of this case in Note
(1934) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 285.
18. Mitchell v. Sklar, 196 So. 392 (La. App. 1940) (a workmen's compensa-
tion suit). Plaintiff erred by serving citation on the defendant as president
of a corporation. No corporation was found to be in existence. The court
held that the prior suit constituted an Interruption, expressly overruling
Matthews v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 10 La. App. 382, 120 So. 907 (1929),
discussed in note 16 supra.
19. In Brandon v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 7 F. Supp. 1008 (W. D. La.
1934), noted in (1934) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 285, plaintiff first sued under Article
2315 in conjunction with others who were Injured in the same accident. The
action was dismissed on an exception of misjoinder of the parties. The
federal court held that the first suit interrupted prescription or peremption,
refusing to apply the holding in the Matthews case.
20. Mitchell v. Sklar, 196 So. 392, 396 (La. App. 1940).
21. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 31 (Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4420]. "In case of per-
sonal injury (including death resulting therefrom) all claims for payments
shall be forever barred unless within one year after the accident or death
the parties shall have agreed upon the payments to be made under this act
or unless within one year after the accident proceedings have been begun
-as provided in sections 17 and 18 of this act." (Italics supplied.)
22. The North Carolina court took a much more liberal view of work-
men's compensation statute of that state, the wording of the one year
limitation being almost identical with the Louisiana statute. Ranks v.
Southern Public Utilities Co., 210 N.C. 312, 186 S.E. 252 (1936), noted in (1936)
15 N.C. Rev. 85. In this case plaintiff notified the industrial commission that
he intended to sue under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. His suit was
dismissed and he then sued under the state act four years after the acci-
dent and was allowed to maintain the action.
In his original brief in the instant case plaintiff urged the application of
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utes are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee 28 and,
had the court been called upon, to determine whether the limita-
tion was that of prescription or peremption, the wording of the
provision in question could easily have sustained its interpreta-
tion as an ordinary prescriptive limitation.
24
G.R.J.
PRESCRIPTION-QUAE TEMPORALIA-EXCEPTION OF REDHIBITORY
DEFECTS-Suit was instituted for the balance due on a promissory
note given in payment for an electric refrigerator and a cook
stove. Defendant, admitting that the note represented the amount
due on the two sales, alleged that the stove failed to live up to
the warranty as it had constantly given him trouble since the first
day it was installed, and he prayed for a rescission of the sale of
the stove. Although no plea of prescription was filed by the plain-
tiff and the court said that it could not supply it, the court inti-
mated that, since more than three years had lapsed since the
purchase, it was too late to file a reconventional demand based on
a redhibitory defect. Passman v. Dawkins, 6 So. (2) 73 (La. App.
1941).
As early as 18231 the Louisiana Supreme Court announced
the rule of law consecrated by the well-known maxim quae tem-
poralia sunt ad agendum perpetua sunt ad excipiendum of early
Roman law.2 In old Roman law, all actions generally speaking
were perpetual and only in some a certain term was specified.3 In
La. Act 39 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2062.1] (interruption by filing suit).
In a supplemental brief, plaintiff conceded that this act had no application
and urged Art. 3518, La. Civil Code of 1870 (interruption by citation).
23. "The judge shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence or by
technical rules or [of] procedure other than herein provided .... The judge
shall decide the merits of the controversy as equitably, summarily and sim-
ply as may be." (Italics supplied.) La. Act 20 of 1914, § 18(4) [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 4408(4)]. Numerous decisions present the view that the statute is
to be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose. See Clark v.
Alexandria Cooperage & Lbr. Co., 157 La. 135, 102 So. 96 (1924); Hinton v.
Louisiana Central Lbr. Co., 148 So. 478 (La. App. 1933); Dodd v. Lakeview
Motors, Inc., 149 So. 278 (La. App. 1933); Terry v. Sparco Oil Corp., 150 So.
391 (La. App. 1934); Burk v. Gulf Refining Co. of La., 171 So. 155 (La. App.
1936).
24. Compare Ray v. Liberty Industrial Life Ins. Co., 180 So. 855 (La.
App. 1938), noted in (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 312.
1. Thompson v. Milburn, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 468 (La. 1823).
2. "Things which afford a ground of action if raised within a certain
time, may be pleaded at any time by way of exception." Ballentine, Law Dic-
tionary, 1059.
3. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law (1921) 558; Buckland, A Manual
of Roman Private Law (1928) 343, 369.
